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JURISDICTION OF APPELLATE COURT
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this mater pursuant to Utah Code
Annotated Section 78-2a-3 (2)(h), as an appeal from a final Order entered in the
underlying civil proceeding.

STANDARD FOR REVIEW
The standard for review of whether the Judge Iwasaki properly modified Mr.
Catten's alimony obligation from $900.00 per month to $600.00 per month is that the
trial court has broad discretion in awarding alimony so long as it considered the
relevant factors regarding awards of alimony, and if the trial court did consider all the
relevant factors and made sufficient findings as to those factors, its discretion will not
be disturbed. See Haumont v. Haumont. 793 P. 2d 421 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
The factors set forth by statute that the court is to consider regarding an award
of alimony are set forth in Utah Code Annotated 30-3-5 (7) and include, (i) the financial
condition and needs of the recipient, (ii) the recipient's earning capacity or ability to
provide income, and (iii) the ability of the payor spouse to provide support. Additionally
the Court is to consider the standard of living existing at the time of separation in
3

determining the amount of alimony. Under Section 30-3-5(7)(d), the Court may attempt
to equalize the parties standard of living. As long as the Court considers the three
factors cited above, it may consider other factors and the Court of Appeals should only
disturb the trial court's ruling upon a showing that such serious inequity has resulted as
to manifest a clear abuse of discretion. Cox v. Cox, 877 P.2d 1262 (Ut. Ct. App. 1994).
Under Utah Code Annotated Section 30-3-5 (7)(g)(i) the trial court has
continuing jurisdiction to make substantive changes and new orders based upon
substantial material change in circumstances not foreseeable at the time of the divorce.
In making such a determination, the trial court is guided by the same standards for
setting the award of alimony as in setting the initial award. See.
As to factual findings in this case, they shall not be overturned unless they are
clearly erroneous. Conclusions of law are reviewed for correctness. W. Fiberglass v.
Kirton. McConkie etc., 789 P.2d 34 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
Mr. Catten's challenge to Judge Iwasaki's decision to reduce alimony to $600
per month must be rejected unless he marshals all the evidence to demonstrate that all
the evidence supporting the court's award, when viewed in the light most favorable to
Mrs. Catten, is insufficient to support the award. A failure to marshal the evidence and
show the trial court's decision is so lacking as to be against the clear weight of the
evidence in a manner which results in a clear abuse of discretion, will result in the
appeal being denied. See Walton v, Walton. 814 P.2d 619 (Utah Ct. App. 1991);
Larson v. Larson. 888 P.2d 719 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). In fact, in a recent case, the
4

Court of Appeals has stated that it is not to substitute its judgment for that of the trial
court except in the extraordinary circumstance of a manifest injustice. Reese v. Reese,
984 P.2d 987 (Utah Ct. App. 1999).

DETERMINATIVE STATUTE
Utah Code Annotated Section 30-3-5(7) applies but is not absolutely
determinative of the issues of this case. Many cases in Utah law have addressed this
issue of the setting and modification of alimony. Those cases are generally described
above in the Standard for Review.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Mr. Catten appeals from Judge Iwasaki's ruling modifying his alimony obligation
from $900.00 per month to $600.00 per month. This is the only issue on appeal. Mr.
Catten sought to have Judge Iwasaki eliminate in total his alimony obligation based
upon his claim that Mrs. Catten has no need for alimony and so has appealed the
decision due to the Court's decision not to eliminate in full his obligation.
Judge Iwasaki found there was a substantial change in the material
circumstances regarding Mr. Catten's employment circumstances, and as such made
findings permitting him to change the alimony award. Mrs. Catten does not challenge
that finding or that portion of the ruling. Therefore the Court had the authority to
reconsider the amount of the alimony award in the case. This appeal is therefore
concerned solely with whether Judge Iwasaki properly considered the alimony criteria
5

and made adequate findings to support the modification he made.
Since this an appeal of a modification of a prior award, the propriety of the initial
award of alimony, the amount and circumstances may not be challenged. However
contrary to the claim of Appellant, evidence was taken in this proceeding that gave the
Court a factual context for the key elements of its decision. Those elements set forth
below in the Statement of Facts.
The appellant's brief improperly attempts to quote Commissioner Bradford and
Judge Iwasaki and to give weight to their non-evidentiary statements, even though their
statements were not recorded and were part of pre-trial settlement discussions. Rather
than similarly mislead the court and suggest that she is quoting Commissioner Bradford
and Judge Iwasaki without the benefit of a transcript, Mrs. Catten respectfully requests
that the Court strike and ignore the allegations made in Appellant's brief in numbered
paragraphs 3 and 4 on the bottom of pages 6 and 7 of his brief (Appellant did not
number the pages of his brief, but Appellee is counting forward from the first page of
Appellant's brief after the cover page).
This entire appeal is based upon the fact that Mr. Catten cannot accept that his
ex-wife has taken the money he paid in alimony and saved it for retirement. In Mr.
Catten's mind and arguments, that Mrs. Catten uses the alimony he pays to save for
retirement means she did not need the alimony and does need any more alimony in the
future, despite the fact that she is now 60 years old and she had no retirement prior to
the divorce at the end of a 30 year marriage.
Mr. Catten argues that because Mrs. Catten lived frugally, waiting to receive the
6

alimony from him before committing to spend it, means she did not need the alimony.
In hindsight, she had no other economically responsible option. Mrs. Catten testified
she could not afford to rent an apartment or make a house payment since their divorce
in 1993 due to Mr. Catten's sporadic alimony payment history. When Mr. Catten finally
was taken to court to force him to pay the alimony he owed, and then he did pay, Mrs.
Catten put the money into retirement accounts. (Tr at 57, 58).
Mrs. Catten had to leave the marital residence shortly after the divorce because
it was sold to pay tax liabilities incurred by Mr. Catten. As an accountant, Mr. Catten
had not filed his tax returns for 12 years and had incurred substantial tax liabilities.
When the parties were divorced, Mrs. Catten went from living in a family home, to
having to live in a small two bedroom, one bathroom house with her parents because
she had no earning skills, no money to buy a home, and Mr. Catten only paid alimony
sporadically. (Tr at 73). To the contrary, Mr. Catten lives in a fully finished and
furnished 5 bedroom home, with substantial equity in the home, with his new wife.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
In addition to those findings made by the Court (R. At 275-278) where the
income and expenses of each of the parties is discussed, additional material facts to
the Court's decision regarding this appeal are as follows:
1. Mr. Catten denied that his age was any factor in his request for an elimination
of alimony. (Tr at 22)
2. Mr. Catten knew Mrs. Catten had to move out of the family residence and
7

have it sold, shortly after the divorce, as a result of the tax liens on the home. (Tr at
27-28).
3. Mr. Catten knew Mrs. Catten had no retirement available to her at the time of
the divorce. (Trat27).
4. Within 6 months after the divorce, in November of 1993, Mr. Catten had
remarried and began living again in a comfortable residence. That residence was sold,
another purchased and now he lives in a 5 bedroom residence, with a fully furnished
basement, with substantial equity in it. (Tr at 34-36).
5. The home Mr. Catten lives in has plenty of room for grandchildren to visit in
and stay in. (Tr at 36-37).
6. Mr. Catten has been able to travel extensively since the divorce. (Tr at 3839).
7. Mr. Catten has fully furnished his home (Tr at 40-41).
8. Mr. Catten gets a substantial income tax deduction (on his 1998 tax return in
the amount of $8670) as the result of the interest he pays for a home mortgage. (Tr at
41).
9. Mr. Catten only pays $765 for his home mortgage. (Exhibit 1 to Appellant's
brief, trial exhibit D-1). This means he pays $9189 each year for his first mortgage, and
get to deduct all but $519 of that payment. This is what it costs him each year to live in
a fully furnished, 5 bedroom house where his grandchildren can come.
10. Mrs. Catten has 8 grandchildren, and has no place for them to stay when
they come to visit her. (Tr at 57, 66).
8

11. Mr. Catten only paid his court ordered alimony sporadically. (R. At 132-135,
147-150). See also a copy of Exhibit P-6 attached hereto as Appendix 1.
12. As a result of Mr. Catten's sporadic alimony payments since the divorce in
1993, Mrs. Catten did not dare commit to purchasing a house or renting an apartment
since the divorce and so has been forced to live with her parents in their small two
bedroom, one bathroom home. (Tr at 57, Trial exh. P-6).
13. Mrs. Catten has no education or training that has prepared her to earn more
than her current level of earnings (Tr at 58-60).
14. Mrs. Catten never had any earnings of substance during the marriage (Tr at
59).
ARGUMENT
Mr. Catten's position is simple no matter how he states it. He believes that Mrs.
Catten does not need any alimony because the alimony he pays her gets invested in
retirement accounts. In fact the exact quote from Mr. Catten is"... investing in
retirement and IRA accounts and indiscriminate gifts are not actual living expenses [for]
which alimony must be paid to avoid becoming a public charge." No legal support was
provided for that claim. But it is true the contrary position is stated in Utah law. See
Cox, supra.
In the first instance, Mr. Catten's brief represents a total failure to marshal the
evidence as required in an appeal. Mr. Catten's entire Statement of Facts and
Argument Sections state only the Appellant's position and facts construed as Appellant
wants them construed, with no attempt to show how they could or should be viewed in
9

the light most favoring the court's decision. A failure to marshal the evidence results in
the denial of an appeal.
Mr. Catten's argues that the trial court should have made at least a pro rata
reduction in the amount of alimony to the income he was earning at the time of the
divorce (70% by his calculation). There is no law for this position so it has no merit.
Mr. Catten argued that his expenses were $4415 per month, which were shared
equally with his new wife. See Exhibit 1 to Appellant's brief. Yet he failed to point out
in his argument how his annual tax deduction for home mortgage interest has the effect
of reducing his actual living expenses by the value of the deduction to a net payment
for living in his five bedroom, fully furnished home to about a third of the cost. That
deduction reduces his monthly living expenses to about $3900 per month, to be jointly
shared with his wife. The trial court could clearly consider this reduction in his
expenses when determining his ability to pay. A similar reduction in expense can be
attributed to his second mortgage of $405 per month.
The arguments that Mrs. Catten's expenses could be lowered were considered
by the Court and it did not do so. Even if the failure to reduce her expenses is a
legitimate issue, the amount of reduction would not be material and the Court clearly
found Mrs. Catten has shown herself to be careful with her money. The fact that the
Trial Court considered Mrs. Catten's income and expenses shows her need for alimony
and ability to provide for herself was explicitly considered by the court. The same
consideration of Mr. Catten's income and expenses occurred. Once that had occurred,
the trial court could consider other factors as well.
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The claim by Mrs. Catten that she did not dare rent an apartment or get into a
house due to the sporadic nature of Mr. Catten's alimony payments is neither illogical
or anticipatory, as argued by him. In fact he did fail to make regular alimony payments
in large amounts, and the argument is only illogical if you reject frugality and fiscal
responsibility as qualities the court should encourage. Mrs. Catten did not get into a
house she could not pay for, or an apartment she would have had to leave. Instead,
Mrs. Catten waited until she got alimony to commit it to a use, in the waiting period she
lived frugally and saved the alimony for her retirement once she received it.
Mrs. Catten is 60 years old. She only has a few more productive earning years
at her level of income. To reject her frugality is to say if she had been in a house or
apartment with a payment of $500-800 per month, and either lost the house or had to
leave the apartment due to Mr. Catten's failure to make his alimony payments in a
timely manner, according to Mr. Catten that might show she needed the alimony.
Where Mrs. Catten sacrificed to live in cramped living conditions, with her parents after
spending her entire adult life away from them, where she cannot have her
grandchildren stay, is according to Mr. Catten reason to say she has no need for
continued alimony. Mr. Catten seeks to benefit from his failure to make his regular
alimony payments by saying Mrs. Catten did not need the money because she placed
the money towards her coming retirement. To permit him to do so would be improper.
In fact Judge Iwasaki recognized this in his findings. (TR at 73).
Judge Iwasaki stated that one of the purposes of alimony is to avoid having
people become wards of the state. In fact this is a stated purpose of alimony. See
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Cox, supra. Judge Iwasaki found that Mrs. Catten's frugality is something that was
required of her under the circumstances of this divorce and Mr. Catten's failure to make
his regular alimony payments.
Judge Iwasaki also recognized the inequity of Mr. Catten being in a 5 bedroom,
fully furnished home, as the result of the contributions of a new spouse (something the
court can consider by statute), while Mrs. Catten had to leave the family home after the
divorce and stay in a cramped, small home with her parents where even her
grandchildren cannot stay overnight. This inequity is another reason why the court did
not eliminate the alimony award or reduce it dollar for dollar as suggested by Mr.
Catten.
The Trial Court clearly considered the three factors of Utah Code Annotated
Section 30-3-5(7) regarding the needs of the recipient, the ability of recipient to provide
for herself, and the ability of the payor to pay. All that evidence came in by way of
exhibits of tax returns and lists of expenses by both parties. Once the court had
considered that evidence and made findings as it did, it is free to consider other factors.
The Court did consider other factors such as the standard of living during the marriage
when Mrs. Catten lived in a family home that she was forced to move from, that she has
a limited earning future, that she had no retirement for herself, that Mr. Catten had only
made sporadic alimony payments, that Mr. Catten had a new spouse with assets which
permit him to live in a five bedroom, fully furnished home with room for his
grandchildren to visit and stay, while Mrs. Catten has no such asset or opportunity.
Judge Iwasaki considered the relevant factors regarding an award of alimony, as
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well as the additional factors he may consider by law. According to the cases on this
subject, he has wide discretion once he has considered the principal factors of need,
ability to provide for herself and ability of Mr. Catten to pay. Judge Iwasaki's discretion
can only be set aside if he has been shown to have made a decision that is so void of
support or so wrong as to be clearly erroneous. That has not occurred in this case.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Catten received a reduction in his alimony obligation. He has never yet paid
his obligation on time or in full without Mrs. Catten having to file legal proceedings to
collect. At the time of the trial in December of 2000, Mr. Catten had not paid one penny
of alimony since before October of 1998. Divorce courts are courts of equity. Based
on equity alone, Mr. Catten's unclean hands should require a dismissal of his appeal.
By not paying his alimony with any semblance of regularity, Mr. Catten placed
Mrs. Catten in a position of either being fiscally foolish by relying on payments that
would not be forthcoming, or being fiscally prudent and frugal by not spending the
money until she got it. Once Mrs. Catten received her alimony, rather than spending it
on jewelry, travel or even rent, she saved for her retirement. How unnecessary (or at
least that is what Mr. Catten would have the court accept) unless one of the stated
purposes of alimony really is to avoid having divorcing parties become wards of the
state.
The court made adequate findings as to Mrs. Cattens income, her expenses, her
ability to provide for herself and Mr. Catten's ability to pay alimony. Those findings are
13

supported by the evidence and the Appellant has not even begun to marshal the
evidence as he is required to do to support his appeal.
Mr. Catten has shown he can pay alimony. The amount of alimony ordered by
the court is not unsupportable by the evidence so in the absence of a clear abuse of
discretion, which has not been in any proven by Mr. Catten, the order of Judge Iwasaki
should not be disturbed.
DATED this ! l ^

day of April, 2002.
Respectfully Submitted:

A/'
Richard N. Bigelow
Attorney for Appellee
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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Attorney for Appellant
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